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Counterfactual thinking is the consideration of how things 
could have turned out differently, usually taking the form of 
counterfactual conditionals.  This experiment examined the 
psychological mechanisms that transform counterfactuals into 
deontic guidance rules for the future.  We examined how 
counterfactual thinking translates into deontic guidance rules 
by asking participants to infer these deontic conclusions from 
the counterfactual premises.  Participants were presented with 
a vignette and a counterfactual conditional, and assigned to 
either a control condition or a suppression condition in which 
they were additionally presented with conflicting normative 
rules.  The presence of conflicting norms reduced the 
likelihood of positive deontic conclusions being endorsed and 
increased the likelihood of negative deontic conclusions being 
endorsed. Future intentionality and regret intensity ratings 
were reduced in the suppression condition.  The same 
conditions that affect normative inference also affect regret 
and future planning, suggesting similar cognitive mechanisms 
underlie these processes.   
Keywords: conflicting norms; counterfactual thinking; 
deontic introduction; new paradigm; regret  
Introduction  
All of us have to make many deontic judgments about what 
we ‘should’ and ‘ought’ to do. As Elqayam, Thompson, 
Wilkinson, Evans and Over (2015) note, when we learn 
about poverty in Somalia, we naturally infer that we ought 
to donate to famine relief.  Such inferences are made on a 
daily basis, often about such everyday matters as the type of 
coffee we ‘must’ or ‘should’ buy, or the types of food we 
'must not' or 'should not' eat. People readily infer these 
deontic statements from premises that contain no deontic 
content. However, very little is known about the 
psychological processes underlying the inferences.  
Recently reasoning research has undergone a shift 
towards the ‘new paradigm’ of reasoning (Elqayam & Over, 
2013 and see other contributions in this special issue; Evans, 
2012).  The ‘new paradigm’ of reasoning rejects binary 
logic, regards reasoning as strongly related to judgement 
and decision making, focuses on probabilities and 
emphasizes pragmatic factors.  Such an approach 
demonstrates how reasoning can be applied to our everyday 
judgement and decision making.  If this is the case, then it is 
persuasive that reasoning, judgement and decision making 
may adopt similar psychological processes.   
This paper expands upon our previous work within this 
area (Elqayam et al., 2015), where we examined how we 
make such deontic judgements from non-deontic content, a 
process termed deontic introduction.  The next section 
presents an overview of our previous research on this area 
with the use of conflicting norms.  Our aim for this paper is 
to see if we can extend Elqayam et al.'s (2015) findings with 
counterfactual conditionals and this is why the section after 
examines previous work on counterfactual thinking to set 
the scene for our own research.  Within this section we refer 
to literature on the functional basis of counterfactual 
thinking (e.g., Epstude & Roese, 2008) which provides a 
rationale for us extending our work on deontic introduction 
into this domain.  The final section before the method 
section provides an overview of the hypotheses for our 
current experiment.      
  
Previous Work on Deontic Introduction  
Elqayam et al. (2015) examined the process of deontic 
introduction which entails making deontic inferences from 
content that contains no deontic material and which is 
pragmatic or informal type of inference (e.g., Hahn & 
Oaksford, 2007).  Deontic introduction is an inference 
which is socially contextualised, based on previous beliefs 
and desires and is probabilistic and defeasible (e.g., 
Oaksford & Chater, 2007).  By defeasible we mean an 
inference can be withdrawn or suppressed in light of 
additional information (Elio & Pelletier, 1997).   
Elqayam et al. (2015) propose that deontic introduction 
depends on a chain of inferences which are largely implicit.  
We begin with a conditional that bears utility (utility 
conditional) (e.g., If you pull the dog’s tail, then it will bite 
you).  When presented with this statement we make a goal 
valence inference in that a valenced outcome (positive 
negative or neutral) is implicitly inferred from the 
description of the outcome (e.g., being bitten is bad).  We 
then make a causal inference which infers a causal link 
between the action and outcome (e.g., pulling the dog’s tail 
makes the dog bite).     Given we now have the information 
that being bitten is bad and that pulling to dog’s tail makes 
the dog bite psychological value passes via the causal link 
from the inferred goal to the action (e.g., pulling the dog’s 
tail is costly) this is known as valence transference.  This 
then feeds into deontic bridging: the valence can bridge into 
a novel norm expressed by a deontic operator (e.g., you 
should not pull the dog’s tail).   
Elqayam et al. (2015) conducted a series of experiments 
to test various features of the model.  They adopted the 
same core design throughout their studies: they presented a 
vignette describing a protagonist and a situation with a 
utility conditional presented underneath.  Then participants 
had to rate the degree to which it follows that the 
protagonist must, should and may (positive deontic 
operator) and must not, should not and need not (negative 
deontic operator) and going to and not going to (inductive 
conclusion) take the action to bring around the outcome.  
This experiment examines Elqayam et al.’s defeasibility 
hypothesis, and so the inference suppression paradigm was 
adopted (e.g., Stevenson & Over, 1995) in which an 
additional premise is presented to weaken the strength of the 
initial argument.   Our particular focus is on conflicting 
norms.  Say we are informed that going to a particular 
holiday region will lead us to having a good holiday.  Since 
this is something we wish to do it is likely that we would 
choose to go to that location.  If we are later informed that 
the particular holiday region has hunts for endangered 
species, and we are against such hunting, this causes a 
conflict between the norm generated by deontic introduction 
and the pre-existing norm presented separately.  This blocks 
deontic bridging by priming a normative conclusion that is 
opposite to the one generated by deontic bridging.   The 
result is that participants are less likely to infer positive 
deontic operators when a conflicting norm is presented 
compared to when it is not, and more likely to endorse 
negative deontic operators when a conflicting norm is 
present compared to when it is not, as found by Elqayam et 
al. (2015).  We wish to examine whether this effect occurs 
for counterfactual conditionals.   
 
Previous Work on Counterfactual Thinking   
Counterfactual thinking can be defined in more than one 
way, but in the context of this paper, we take it to be 
considering how things could have turned out differently, 
for better or worse (see Byrne, 2016 for a review).  A 
student who does not study hard for an exam and then 
subsequently fails that exam may imagine a world in which 
they did study and they received a good mark.  This process 
may in turn then lead them to the decision that in future they 
will study for exams.  Whilst such a process of 
counterfactual thinking elicits emotions such as regret (e.g., 
Wilkinson, Ball, & Alford, 2015; Zeelenberg, 1999) it is 
said to have functional properties in that it can help people 
prepare for similar situations in the future (e.g., Epstude & 
Roese, 2008).   
Research on counterfactual thinking has often employed 
vignette-based paradigms, where participants are presented 
with a scenario about a protagonist and are required to make 
a judgement.  This research has yielded some consistent 
results. One is the temporal order effect, in which actions 
are regretted more in the short term, and inactions more in 
the long term (e.g., Gilovich & Medvec, 1994). Much 
related research has been done on counterfactual 
conditionals. These conditionals, of the form if p had been q 
would have been, presuppose that p and q are false. In the 
example of us going on holiday to a particular region, it 
could be asserted, "If I had gone on holiday to that particular 
region, then I would have enjoyed my holiday better".    
When we are faced with a conflicting norm and the 
outcome turns out negatively we could argue that the 
outcome was out of our control since taking the action 
would mean that we behave in a manner which conflicts 
with our norms in life.  In this instance participants may 
report that the protagonist may feel less regret when a 
conflicting norm is present relative to when it is not.  
Previous work has demonstrated that people are more likely 
to mutate controllable rather than uncontrollable features in 
the wake of a negative event (e.g., Girotto, Legrenzi & 
Rizzo, 1991).  If people are more likely to mutate 
controllable aspects of events, then it may follow that when 
an outcome is in a protagonist’s control participants predict 
they will feel greater regret in the wake of a negative 
outcome relative to when it is not as much in their control.   
Counterfactual thinking arises from comparing what 
actually happened to what might have happened. Such 
comparison, made ‘upwards’ (it could have been better), or 
‘downwards’ (it could have been worse), help us plan for 
the future (e.g., Roese, 1994; Epstude & Roese, 2008). We 
propose that these future plans are mediated by normative 
rule generation. For example, faced with a disappointing 
exam result, a student might think she could have done 
better had she not been hung over. This in turn leads to the 
creation of a normative rule, ‘I should not drink on an 
exam’s eve’. In the psychology of reasoning, this process is 
called ‘deontic introduction’ (Elqayam et al., 2015). Our 
goal is to study the psychological mechanisms governing 
this transition from counterfactual thinking to deontic rule, 
and its effect on future planning 
 
Hypotheses 
This experiment aimed to extend that of Elqayam et al. 
(2015) by adopting counterfactual conditionals, rather than 
indicative conditionals, to examine the effect of conflicting 
norms.  Indicative conditionals are of the form ‘If p than q’, 
linking an antecedent p to a consequent q.   Please see 
below an example of a set of stimuli for one of the scenarios 
that participants had to reason about.  The predictions were 
presented with reference to the stimuli.  
 
 
Martin has a new girlfriend, Gabrielle.  He is keen to 
impress her by cooking a meal and is at the supermarket 
looking at different oils since he is making an Italian dish.  
Martin can buy a special olive oil produced in Fontignani.  
He opts for the cheaper oil and goes home.  After he has 
cooked the meal and serves up he finds that the pasta is a 
bit greasy. He says to his girlfriend:  
 
 If I had opted for the Fontignani olive oil, then our pasta 
dish would have tasted better.  (control condition)  
 
 However, the Fontignani olive oil is produced using 
intensive farming practices.  If Martin uses the Fontignani 
oil, then he will be contributing to environmental 
degradation of the area (additional information for 
suppression condition)  
 
There are a number of predictions we have: (1) that 
conflicting norms will suppress deontic introduction for 
counterfactual conditionals in the same manner that they do 
for indicative conditionals.   With a conflicting norm 
present, conclusions with positive deontic operators will be 
less likely to be rated and conclusions with negative deontic 
operators more likely to be rated relative to no conflicting 
norm being present.  In the example above, (2) Martin will 
be viewed as less inclined to use Fontignani oil if there is a 
conflicting norm present, e.g. a wish to avoid environmental 
degradation. When participants are asked how likely the 
protagonist is to take the action in the future, they will rate it 
as less likely than when a conflicting norm is absent, and (3) 
the participants will predict the protagonist will feel less 
regret intensity in the conflicting norm condition relative to 
the control condition.   The reason for this is that they would 
have needed to take an action that conflicted with a norm 
(e.g., contribute to environmental degradation) to bring 
around the desirable outcome. 
 Both the first and second hypotheses derive out of the 
work of Elqayam et al. who found that conflicting norms 
defeated deontic introduction and the third hypothesis 
relating to regret emerges from the previous literature on 
counterfactual thinking which indicates that participants are 
more likely to mutate controllable relative to uncontrollable 
aspects that led to an unfortunate outcome (e.g., Girotto et 
al., 1991).  It therefore follows that if participants are more 
likely to mutate controllable aspects then these controllable 
aspects may in turn lead to the inference that the protagonist 
will feel greater regret when the situation was in their 
control and no conflicting norm was present then when the 
conflicting norm may have taken the outcome somewhat out 
of their control.   
Method  
Participants  
Seventy-eight participants completed the experiment and 
were recruited via Crowdflower a crowd sourcing platform 
enabling members of the public to participate in research for 
a small financial reimbursement.  There were 40 females 
and 37 males with 1 participant not disclosing gender.  
Participants age range was 21-75 years. Twenty participants 
stated Canada was their country of residence, 27 UK, 29 
USA and 1 Australia.  One participant did not disclose a 
country of residence.  If participants reported a diagnosis of 
dyslexia, if English was not their first language or they 
failed to answer the attention checking question correctly 
their data were excluded from analysis.  This left us with 62 
participants.     
 
Experimental Design, Materials and Procedure   
A mixed design was adopted.  Participants were either 
randomly assigned to the control condition, in which they 
were just presented with the vignette and conditional 
statement or the suppression condition, in which participants 
were additionally presented with a conflicting norm.  
Participants had to then complete three tasks which are 
explained below: (1) a deontic rating task, (2) an 
intentionality question and (3) a regret intensity question.  
The independent variables were whether participants were 
in the condition to which participants were assigned (control 
or suppression) and the deontic operators (must, should, 
may and must not, should not and need not).  The dependent 
variables were conclusion rating of the deontic operators 
from 1 = definitely does not follow to 7 = definitely follows, 
future intentionality rating from 1 = not at all likely to 7 = 
highly likely and regret intensity rating from 1 = low regret 
to 7 = high regret.   Each task was presented on a separate 
page.  There was a practice item at the top of each page to 
get participants used to each task. Participants reasoned 
about five vignettes.  Materials were modified from 
Elqayam et al. (2015) Experiment 3.   
The deontic rating task asked participants to rate the 
degree to which it followed that the protagonist must, must 
not, should, may and need not take the action in the 
vignette.  Participants were required to state for each deontic 
operator whether they thought it definitely does not follow, 
follows very weakly, follows weakly, follows to some 
degree, follows strongly or follows very strongly.  
Participants completed a regret rating task. They had to rate 
the degree of regret they thought the protagonist would feel 
on a 7-point scale from 1 = low regret to 7 = a high regret.  
The future intentionality task asked participants to state the 
degree to which they thought that the protagonist would be 
likely to take the action in the future.  Again, participants 
rated this on a 7-point scale from 1 = not at all likely to 7 = 
highly likely.  
 
Results 
Deontic Introduction   
As can be seen in Table 1, all positive deontic operators 
receive higher ratings in the control condition relative to the 
suppression condition and all negative operators receive 
higher ratings in the suppression condition relative to the 
control condition.  A 2 (condition: suppression or control) x 
6 (operator: must, must-not, should, should-not, may and 
need-not) ANOVA was conducted and found an operator x 
condition interaction F(5, 255) = 12.63, MSE = 2.65, p < 
.01,   ηp2= .20. A significant main effect of operator was 
observed using a Greenhouse-Geisser correction F(2.73, 
139.25) = 45.50, MSE = 2.65, p < .05, ηp2 = .47 but no main 
effect of condition F(1, 51) = 1.04, MSE = 2.56 p = .31, 
ηp2= .02.       
 
Table 1: Mean (and standard deviation) ratings for each 
deontic operator as a function of condition   
 
Operator  Control  Suppression  
Must  4.31 (1.62)  2.96 (1.15)  
Should  5.55 (0.92)  3.80 (0.93)  
May  5.37 (1.21)  4.93 (1.19)   
Must not  1.96 (1.28)  2.76 (1.38)  
Should not  2.06 (1.35)  3.09 (1.24)  
Need not  2.93 (1.24)  3.54 (1.62)  
 
In order to unpack the operator x condition interaction, we 
conducted six independent samples t-tests for each operator 
separately.  This was found to be significant for the 
operators must, should and should not with a p < .008 with 
the adoption of a Bonferroni correction but not for the must 
not p = .03, may p = .19 and need-not p = .13.  These fit 
with our first hypothesis that conflicting norms will lead to 
lower ratings for positive deontic operators compared to the 
control condition with the reverse the case for negative 
deontic operators.   
 
Future Intentionality and Regret Ratings   
We then examined the future intentionality ratings 
comparing the control condition to the suppression 
condition.  We compared mean likelihood ratings across the 
scenarios for the control and suppression conditions and 
found future intention ratings were higher in the control 
condition (M = 5.95, SD = 0.49) compared to the 
suppression condition (M = 4.48, SD = 0.96) a finding 
which reached significance when conducting an 
independent samples t-test t(51) = 6.80 p < .01.  This 
supports our hypothesis that future intentionality will be 
weakened in the suppression condition.   
Our final analysis considered the reported regret intensity 
that participants thought the protagonist would feel.  It was 
found that participants thought the protagonists in the 
control condition would experience greater regret intensity 
(M = 5.61, SD = 0.66) comparative to the suppression 
condition (M = 4.44, SD = 1.09) a finding which was 
significant when undertaking an independent samples t-test 
t(51) = 4.58, p < .01.   This supports our hypothesis that the 
level of regret intensity the participant thinks the protagonist 
will feel is less in the suppression condition compared to the 
control condition.     
General Discussion  
The aim of this experiment was to examine the process of 
deontic introduction for counterfactual conditionals rather 
than indicative conditionals.  We examined the defeasibility 
hypothesis adopting conflicting norms to block the deontic 
bridging stage of deontic introduction.  We proposed three 
hypotheses at the start of our paper (1) that conflicting 
norms will suppress deontic introduction in the context of 
counterfactual conditionals, as they do with indicative 
conditionals, (2) when a conflicting norm is present 
participants will rate the protagonist’s intention to take the 
action in the future as lower than when no conflicting norm 
is present and (3) when a conflicting norm is present regret 
intensity for the outcome will be rated as lower compared to 
when no conflicting norm is present.    
Support was found for the first hypothesis with positive 
deontic operators rated as lower in the conflicting norms 
condition relative to the control condition with the reverse 
pattern occurring for negative deontic operators.  This 
finding supports the defeasibility hypothesis of Elqayam et 
al. (2015) and extends to findings of Elqayam et al. to 
counterfactual conditionals.  We propose the same 
explanation for these findings that Elqayam et al. offer in 
their paper.  Deontic bridging is not able to occur due to a 
conflict between the pre-existing norm and the invited 
normative conclusion (generated by deontic introduction).   
When it came to our item analysis for each of the 
operators we observed significant effects for must, should 
and should not.   Taking into consideration the marginal 
significant effect of must not we note that the significant 
differences lie in those operators that express obligations 
and forbidding but not permissions.  This finding suggests 
that perhaps the role of counterfactual thinking is to direct 
future action, making it functional (e.g., Epstude & Roese, 
2008).  In this respect, obligations and forbidding are more 
powerful than permissions, and this could provide an 
explanation for the pattern of results we observed.  
Our second hypothesis was that, for future intentionality 
ratings, participants would predict the protagonist would be 
less likely to take the action when a conflicting norm was 
present compared to when it was not. This is what we 
found.  We propose that this result occurs because a 
conflicting norm prevents deontic bridging.  Such a finding 
supports our prediction that deontic introduction can be used 
to direct future actions as a result of the presence of 
counterfactuals. This is in line with the notion of 
counterfactual thinking is functional (e.g., Epstude & Roese, 
2008).    
Our third hypothesis was participants would report the 
protagonist feeling less regret when a conflicting norm was 
present compared to when it was not.  This hypothesis was 
supported.  We propose that this finding may occur for one 
of two reasons.  The first is that the conflicting norm serves 
to distance the protagonist from the regretted incident by 
providing a justification or rationale for them not taking the 
action.  In the case of Martin and the Fontignani olive oil, 
that justification would be the conflict between having the 
better meal and the fact that he does not want to contribute 
to environmental degradation.  If this process is occurring, 
the decision could be seen as self-enhancing allowing one to 
distance oneself from the regretted outcome (e.g., Feeney, 
Gardiner, Johnston, Jones & McEvoy, 2005).  A second 
reason this effect may occur could be linked to the 
controllability of the outcome.  If we take away the 
conflicting norm in the case of Martin and the Fontignani 
olive oil the outcome is entirely within Martin's hands: he 
did not select the correct olive oil for the dish resulting in 
the dish not being as nice.  However, when we add a 
conflicting norm, that outcome becomes less controllable, 
since he does not want to behave in a manner that conflicts 
with his normative framework.   We propose that perhaps 
less regret is predicted in the suppression condition because 
participants view the outcome as less in control of the 
protagonist.  Girotto et al. (1991) found that participants 
prefer to mutate controllable relative to uncontrollable 
events that lead to a negative outcome.  We propose that, 
when a conflicting norm is presented, this makes taking the 
action to bring about the desired outcome less "controllable" 
in a normative sense: it becomes less permissible or even 
forbidden. Since people are more likely to mutate 
controllable than uncontrollable events that led to a negative 
outcome, it seems intuitive that greater regret intensity will 
be predicted for the control condition, where the outcome is 
within the protagonist's control, than in the suppression 
condition, in which the conflicting norm serves to block the 
action, making it uncontrollable in the normative sense.  
Both hypotheses are possible but the controllability one may 
be stronger since when it comes to distancing oneself from 
the outcome controllability may act as a moderator.  A 
future avenue of research could use a controllability 
manipulation (controllable versus uncontrollable outcome) 
to examine what effect this direct manipulation has on 
deontic introduction.   
A final suggestion for the result lies in the fact that 
participants have to make a comparison when presented 
with a conflicting norm.  For Martin it is the choice between 
using the other oil and the meal not being as tasty to using 
the Fontignani oil and contributing to environmental 
degradation.  It is possible that in these cases preference 
construction occurs on the spot.    
The fact that conflicting norms demonstrate such 
consistent results when also accounting for Elqayam et al.’s 
(2015) findings strongly indicates that people are unwilling 
to go against their normative framework.  Although we did 
not test it directly in our study one proposal is that whilst 
people will generally not go against their normative 
framework for small instances (e.g., having a nice meal) 
they may do so when the outcome generates sufficient 
benefit.  For example, we may be told as children that it is 
wrong to lie, and we must tell the truth, and we may hold 
that norm.  However, if we are placed in a situation in which 
lying could garner a benefit and especially a moral benefit 
(e.g., saving a life) then it may be the case that we act 
against our normative framework in this instance.    
These findings have extended those of Elqayam et al. 
(2015) through demonstrating that their proposed model for 
deontic introduction can be applied to counterfactual 
conditionals.  This is an important theoretical development 
since it indicates that similar cognitive processes are at work 
when reasoning about counterfactual to indicative 
conditionals.  We propose that an avenue for future research 
could be to test different components of the model of 
Elqayam et al. to see whether they are applicable for 
counterfactual counterfactuals in the same manner as they 
are for indicative conditionals.   Elqayam et al.’s work has 
demonstrated that factors such as utility and probability, 
which are deeply rooted in the new paradigm, have an 
impact on deontic introduction for indicative conditionals.  
We propose that such effects may also occur when 
counterfactual conditionals are used.   
Research on deontic introduction has begun by adopting a 
vignette-based paradigm like many areas of reasoning 
research.  One challenge of that paradigm though is seeing 
the degree to which the model can apply to everyday life.   
We propose an interesting extension would entail asking 
participants to recall an instance of real life regret, to 
consider a counterfactual conditional, and then to complete 
the deontic rating task.  Through adopting this approach, we 
hope to learn how deontic introduction can be applied to 
real life regrets, and whether the same experimental 
manipulations, such as conflicting norms, demonstrate the 
same suppression effects as they do in a vignette-based 
paradigm, where the participant is reasoning about an 
unknown protagonist.    
From a methodological perspective we believe it would 
be interesting to examine the cognitive processes 
participants adopt directly via the adoption of think-aloud 
protocols.  This is a process-tracing technique that requires 
participants to think aloud whilst working through a 
problem in order for the researcher to gain insight into 
participants’ thought processes (see Ericsson & Simon, 
1993).  Wilkinson, Ball and Cooper (2010) have utilised 
think aloud protocols using counterfactual vignettes about 
mental states to good effect. Stenning and van Lambalgen 
(2008) show that experimental data can be enriched by the 
use of think aloud protocols, revealing how participants 
understand the task, and the trajectory of their reasoning 
processes. By adopting think aloud protocols whilst asking 
participants to complete the deontic rating task, future 
intentionality and regret questions could provide insights 
into their cognitive processes and potentially add further 
weight to the model of Elqayam et al. (2015).  It would 
enable participants to state how they deal with the presence 
of a conflicting norm within their reasoning.  This would 
enable the test of some of the predictions for the findings 
made within this section.        
This experiment has extended one of the findings of 
Elqayam et al. (2015), demonstrating that deontic 
introduction in the context of conflicting norms is not only 
affected by indicative conditionals but also by 
counterfactual conditionals.  This is an important finding for 
the new paradigm of reasoning (e.g., Evans, 2012; 
Manktelow, Over, & Elqayam, 2011; Over, 2009) with 
subjective degrees of belief at its heart and social pragmatics 
and subjective psychological value having a significant role 
to play (Elqayam & Over, 2013).  We believe that our 
research adds to this field by showing how counterfactual 
conditionals can give rise to new deontic norms. It supports 
the conclusion that, whilst our counterfactual thinking may 
cause us pain, it is truly functional (e.g., Epstude & Roese, 
2008).  As Elqayam et al. (2015) noted, humans are quite 
ready to infer an ‘ought’ from an ‘is’ (see also Hume, 
2000/1739-1740). Our findings indicate that humans are 
also often keen to infer an ‘ought’ from a ‘would have 
been’.    
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